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CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 
Daniel Chow∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article examines whether human rights are linked with trade 
between the United States and China at the multilateral and at the 
national levels.  By linkage, this article refers to whether the United 
States can use human rights as a justification for imposing a trade 
restriction on China and other countries at the multilateral level1 or 
for imposing restrictions at the national legislation level on domestic 
corporations and private actors conducting international business.2   
At the multilateral level, the legal framework for trade is created 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO),3 the key international trade 
institution that now sets forth the general rules for trade in goods, 
services, and technology (or intellectual property)4 that all members 
are required to follow and implement into domestic law.5  Members 
                                                 
∗  Joseph S. Platt-Porter Wright Morris & Arthur Professor of Law, The 
Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law; B.A., J.D. Yale 
University. 
1  See infra Part I.  
2  See infra Part II.  
3   For a discussion of the history and role of the World Trade 
Organization, see DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 25–29 (2d 
ed. 2012) [hereinafter, CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].  
4  There are four channels of trade in the world today: goods, services, 
technology (intellectual property), and foreign direct investment.  See id. at 
1.  The WTO regulates trade in goods under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, services trade under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), and technology trade under the Agreement on 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  Id. at 28.  Only 
investment trade is not regulated by the WTO for historical reasons and due 
to opposition from WTO members.  See id. at 567.  Investment trade is 
regulated at the regional level in free trade areas such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.  Id. at 571.  
5   Each WTO member that undertakes obligations under the WTO 
agreements has a duty to implement those obligations into its domestic legal 
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of the WTO now number 157 countries, including the United States 
and China as well as all of the world’s most important trading states.6  
Part I of this article will examine whether the United States can use 
human rights as a justification for imposing restrictions, such as 
tariffs or quotas7 on imported goods, on trade with China or any 
other country within the framework of the WTO and consistent with 
WTO obligations.  As we shall see, under current WTO law, human 
rights cannot be used to justify a trade restriction against China (or 
any other WTO country).   
Part II of this article will examine whether the United States and 
China link human rights with trade at the national level.  The WTO is 
concerned with trade and economic relations between states, not with 
how states regulate their own domestic corporate actors in the 
conduct of international trade, except insofar as that national 
regulation affects obligations under the WTO.8  To the extent that 
countries regulate their own internal affairs in a fashion that does not 
affect or impinge upon WTO obligations, this national level 
regulation is of no concern to the WTO.  Part II will explain that the 
United States and China have different and competing approaches in 
regulating how their own corporations and persons can conduct 
international business.  The United States has a “hands on” approach 
that links human rights with international business while China 
follows a “hands off” approach that holds that human rights are of no 
concern to the corporate actor or business person.9  These approaches 
are based upon contrasting long term political objectives of the two 
countries and may come into increasing conflict as China’s economic 
                                                                                              
order.  This is done by enacting domestic legislation that embodies the 
requirements of the WTO agreements.  The United States has implemented 
its WTO obligations throughout various scattered provisions of federal and 
state statutes.  For a detailed discussion of implementation of WTO 
obligations into the domestic legal orders of the United States and the 
European Union.  See id. at 95–128.  
6  See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Aug. 
24, 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
7  Tariffs and quotas are forms of trade restriction.  See discussion infra 
Part I.A–B. 
8  See generally CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 
supra note 3, at 25–29.  For discussion of how the WTO disciplines internal 
regulations that affect international trade.  See id. at 142–72.  
9  See infra Part II.A–B.  
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power and influence continues to expand rapidly and may begin to 
challenge the dominance of the United States approach in 
international trade and business.10 
 
I.   LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS TO TRADE WITH CHINA AT  
THE MULTILATERAL LEVEL 
To understand the modern WTO approach to human rights and 
trade, it is important to first understand the background of the often 
contentious debate between the United States and China on whether 
China needs to respect human rights in order to trade with the United 
States.  The next section explores this history and the legal issues 
involved. 
 
A.   HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S.–CHINA RELATIONS 
Prior to 2001, the year in which China became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States conditioned the 
use of tariff rates on imported goods from China on the basis of a 
review of China’s human rights policies under the Jackson–Vanik 
amendment,11 which requires an annual presidential certification that 
the country in question placed no obstacles to freedom of emigration 
of its citizens or, as in the case of a country such as China, a 
presidential waiver of such full compliance.12  The tariff rates applied 
                                                 
10  See id.  
11  See Freedom of emigration in East−West Trade, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 
(2006).  The Jackson–Vanik amendment was passed as part of Title IV of the 
1974 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 93–618, 88 Stat. 2056, signed into law on Jan. 
3, 1971 by President Gerald Ford.  The purpose of the amendment was to 
create pressure on the Soviet Union to allow the emigration of Soviet Jews to 
Israel and the United States.  For a fuller discussion of the background of the 
Jackson–Vanik amendment, see Thomas J. Probert, The Innovation of the 
Jackson–Vanik Amendment, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 
(Brendan Sims & D.J.B. Trim eds., 2011).  
12  See 19 U.S.C. § 2432.  As a technical matter, the Jackson–Vanik 
amendment was not targeted at China, but the Soviet Union.  Moreover, the 
Jackson–Vanik amendment was intended to create pressures to allow 
emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union.  However, since the Jackson–
Vanik amendment in theory applied to all nations and required a presidential 
waiver in order for a nation to receive “most-favored-nation” (MFN) 
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to imports from China were a crucial issue in U.S–China trade.  A 
tariff is a duty or tax imposed on the imported good, usually 
expressed as a percentage of the good’s value, when the import clears 
customs at a port of entry in the importing country.13  A higher rate 
of duty will result in a higher tax, with the cost passed onto the 
consumer; higher prices to the consumer tend to result in lower 
demand and fewer imports. 
The United States, as an original contracting party to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 194714 and an original 
member of the WTO, established in 1995,15 is required to impose 
                                                                                              
treatment, the United States began to use the Jackson–Vanik amendment to 
pressure China on human rights issues.  See L. Jay Kuo, Farewell to 
Jackson–Vanik: The Case for Unconditioned MFN Status for the People’s 
Republic of China, 1 ASIAN L.J. 85, 101–103 (1994).  
13  See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 133 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter, CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS].  
14 See GATT Members, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (last updated 2012).  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, a number of countries, led by the 
United States, met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to create a set of 
institutions that would help prevent the disastrous protectionist trade policies 
that contributed to the War.  Two organizations, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, were approved right away by the parties, but 
the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO), designed to promote 
free trade, failed to win approval due mainly to opposition by the United 
States Congress, which believed that the ITO was too ambitious.  To 
jumpstart trade liberalization, the parties agreed on a treaty in 1947, the 
GATT, which was designed to lower tariffs.  The original plan was to have 
the ITO administer the GATT, but after the ITO failed to win approval, the 
GATT 1947 became a de facto international organization and was 
administered by a skeletal staff in Geneva, Switzerland, for close to fifty 
years.  In 1995, as a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the 
World Trade Organization came into existence, and assumed in many ways 
the role that was originally envisioned for the ITO.  For further discussion, 
see CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 18, 
26–28. 
15  See Members and Observers, supra note 6.  The purpose of the WTO 
is to promote free trade and to serve as a forum where nations can discuss 
and sometimes resolve trade disputes.  The WTO administers three major 
disciplines: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade dealing with the 
trade in goods, the General Agreement on Trade in Services dealing with 
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tariffs based upon rates that are agreed upon by all WTO states after 
lengthy negotiations. 16   These rates are much lower than the 
historical rates that the United States used prior to the GATT.17  The 
goal of the GATT is to reduce tariffs to the greatest extent possible in 
order to promote trade in goods and it has been remarkably 
successful in achieving this goal.18  GATT rates are extended to all 
WTO states under the “most-favored-nation” (MFN) principle—one 
of the bedrock principles of the WTO as enshrined in GATT Article 
I.19  In this context, the MFN principle requires equal treatment of all 
                                                                                              
services trade, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights dealing with trade in technology (intellectual property).  The WTO 
also administers a fourth agreement, the Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
which established an effective dispute settlement system within the WTO.  
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 28. 
16  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 
3, at 182.  These rates are contained in each country’s GATT Schedule, i.e. a 
tariff schedule that is filed with the WTO.  See id. 
17  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 
supra note 13, at 146–47.  These pages contain an excerpt from the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.  Column 1 General Rates 
are the GATT rates now in force in the United States.  The Column 2 rates 
are the old Smoot–Hawley tariff rates still in force for countries that are not 
members of the WTO and do not otherwise have a special agreement with 
the United States.  Only a few states fall into this category, mostly rogue 
states, such as North Korea and Cuba, and trade with these states are further 
subject to trade embargoes that block almost all trade for political reasons.  
The rates in Column 2 are up to ten times higher than the GATT rates than 
the Column 1 General Rates.  The Column 1 Special Rates are even lower 
than the GATT rates.  These are the rates applicable under free trade 
agreements reached by the United States and its trading partners.  
18   For an example of the GATT’s success in lowering tariff rates, 
compare the rates in Column 1, the GATT rate, with the rates in Column 2, 
the non-GATT rates, in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
(HTSUS).  For an excerpt from the HTSUS, see CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 13, at 146–47. 
19  GATT Article I set forth the MFN principle, which provides in 
relevant part:   
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind 
imposed on or in connection with importation . . . any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product . . . shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in . . . all other contracting parties. 
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WTO states; all of these states are entitled to the GATT tariff rate, 
which tends to be much lower than the tariff rates for states that are 
not members of the WTO or that do not receive this treatment under 
a separate bilateral agreement with the WTO member.20  In the case 
of the United States, the GATT rate is far lower than the non-GATT 
rate, established by the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1932, which set 
forth prohibitively high tariff rates during the period leading up to the 
Second World War.21  This period was marked by extreme trade 
protectionism and mutual mistrust among many nations, leading to 
tensions that contributed to the War.22  GATT rates are the so-called 
Column 1 rates23 and the Smoot–Hawley rates are the Column 2 
rates24 in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, the 
legal document that sets forth tariffs for all imports into the United 
States.25  
Prior to 2001, at stake annually for China was whether its goods 
would receive the Column 1 GATT rates under the MFN principle or 
the prohibitively high Column 2 non-GATT rates of the Smoot–
Hawley Tariff Act.26  Column 1, or the GATT rates, sets forth the 
normal rates imposed by the United States.  Since the vast majority 
                                                                                              
As a consequence, a country’s lowest GATT-bound tariffs must be 
extended to every member of the WTO.  See General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. I, 61 Stat. pt. 5, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
20  For a further discussion of this point, see supra note 17.  Countries 
can also enter into free trade agreements with the United States to receive 
tariff rates that are more favorable than the GATT rate.  These are the so-
called Column 1 Special Rates.  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 13, at 146–47.  
21  See id. at 145.  
22  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 
3, at 18. 
23  See id. at 188. 
24  See id. at 189. 
25  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 
supra note 13, at 145. 
26   See VLADIMIR N. PREGELJ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30225, 
MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ( 
2001).  In 2000, the last year of annual MFN review for China, over 95% of 
imports from China would have been subject to higher, prohibitive costs if 
China were denied MFN status.  See also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 13, at 146–47. 
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of nations receive Column 1 rates from the United States and only a 
few pariah nations receive the non-GATT rates,27 the MFN term is 
misleading; MFN treatment is the norm in international trade, not a 
privileged exception.  As a result, the United States now uses a 
different terminology—Normal Trade Relations (NTR) instead of the 
MFN term.28  Thus, up until 2001, for China, not yet a member of the 
WTO, the annual issue was whether its goods would receive NTR 
tariffs rates, i.e., normal tariffs, or be subject to the punitive non-
GATT rates. 
Before 2001, the United States conditioned the granting of MFN 
or normal rates upon whether China met the requirements of the 
Jackson–Vanik amendment,29 which required freedom of emigration 
but which over time came to stand for a general requirement of 
respect for human rights.  In the 1990s, an attempt was made to 
introduce additional specific human rights criteria into the annual 
review of China’s MFN status, but these attempts ultimately were 
rejected by the U.S. Congress.30  While the United States used the 
annual review to criticize and pressure China on human rights, the 
United States ultimately never denied MFN treatment or normal 
tariff rates for China during the period leading up to China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001.31  Imposing the punitive non-GATT 
                                                 
27  The non-GATT rate or the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act rates apply 
only to goods imported into the United States from Cuba, Laos, and North 
Korea.  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 13, at 145. 
28  See id. 
29  See 19 U.S.C. § 2432.  
30  Attempts were made by Congress in 1994 to introduce additional 
conditions for MFN renewal related to human rights, including China’s 
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; release of and 
accounting for Chinese political prisoners; humane treatment of prisoners; 
and allowing visits to prisons by international organizations.  All of these 
attempts to introduce general human rights into annual MFN renewal 
ultimately failed in Congress.  See PREGELJ, supra note 26, at 4.  
31  The whole process of China’s annual review began to take on an 
almost predictable pattern: criticism of China’s human rights record by the 
United States in the period leading up to the review, symbolic gestures by 
China in response, such as the release of a few high-profile imprisoned 
political dissidents, and then annual renewal of MFN status for China.  See 
Alan Alexandroff, Concluding China’s Accession to the WTO: The United 
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rates on imports from China would have led to a de facto trade 
embargo with China, a result that neither China nor the United States 
was willing to accept.  
 
B.   THE WTO 
In 2001, after a long negotiation, China acceded to the WTO, 
entitling China as a matter of right to MFN treatment in all areas of 
trade—goods, services, and intellectual property—from all WTO 
members, including the United States.32  China’s accession meant 
that the United States could no longer conduct its annual review of 
China’s human rights record under the Jackson–Vanik amendment.  
Once China became a member of the WTO, China had a legal right 
to GATT tariff rates under the MFN principle from all WTO 
members, including the United States. 33   The Jackson–Vanik 
amendment became irrelevant to China.34 
Within the WTO, a long debate occurred over whether human 
rights should be included within its formal purview.35  Developing 
nations opposed the inclusion of human rights within the WTO 
because they were concerned that they would be subject to the high 
standards set by western-developed nations, such as the United States 
                                                                                              
States Congress and Permanent Most-Favored Nation Status for China, 3 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 23, 32 (1998).   
32  Like every member of the WTO, China is entitled to MFN treatment 
as a matter of right under GATT Article I, setting forth the MFN principle.  
For the relevant language of GATT Article I, see GATT supra note 19, at art. 
I.  See also PREGELJ, supra note 26, at 10.  China’s terms of accession to the 
WTO is governed by its Protocol of Accession.  Accession of the People’s 
Republic of China, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2011). 
33  See PREGELJ, supra note 26, at 10. 
34  Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and China’s entry into 
the WTO, the Jackson–Vanik amendment does not seem relevant to any 
country at all and there have been many calls for its repeal.  Most recently, a 
congressional bill was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on Nov. 
16, 2012, to repeal the amendment.  See Russia and Moldova Jackson–Vanik 
Repeal Act of 2012, H.R. 6156, 112th Cong. (2012). 
35  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 
3, at 369. 
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and the countries of Western Europe.36  Not only did developing 
countries not wish to have western standards imposed upon them, 
they also believed that their non-western standards concerning 
human rights gave them a competitive advantage.37  For example, in 
the workplace, developing nations either had lower labor standards or 
did not enforce their labor laws.38  Adopting laws embodying western 
standards in the workplace and enforcing these laws would create 
additional costs that would erode the competitive advantage of 
developing countries, such as China.  An additional concern to all 
WTO members was that the WTO might collapse under the weight 
of being asked to solve all of the world’s problems.39  If human rights 
were to be a part of the WTO, then the WTO might be under pressure 
to consider many other social issues linked to trade and become the 
forum in which all of the world’s problems would be resolved.  
The debate over human rights culminated in 1996, when the 
WTO issued an official Ministerial Declaration that workers’ rights 
would not be within the formal purview of the WTO, but instead 
would be within the domain of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO)40—a non-governmental organization, which unlike the WTO, 
has no enforcement powers.41  One of the greatest achievements of 
the WTO is a dispute settlement system, which leads most nations to 
                                                 
36  See Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, What You Should Know 
About Globalization and the World Trade Organization, 10 REV. INT’L 
ECON. 404, 416–17 (2002) (describing how developing nations view human 
rights issues as thinly-veiled protectionist measures of developed countries). 
37   See T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and Human Rights, in CONSTITUENT 
INTERESTS AND U.S. TRADE POLICIES 225 (Alan V. Deardoff & Robert M. 
Stern eds., 1998) (describing how low labor standards can be a comparative 
advantage for developing countries). 
38  See Cleopatra Doumbia-Henry & Eric Gravel, Free Trade 
Agreements and Labour Rights: Recent Developments, 145 INT’L LABOUR 
REV. 185, 198–99 (2006) (stating that poverty, weak governments, and lack 
of political will all contribute to non-enforcement of labor standards). 
39  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 
3, at 369. 
40  See id. 
41  The ILO has no dispute settlement mechanism.  Constitution of the 
International Labour Organization, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712, 225 
C.T.I.A. 373. 
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comply eventually with their WTO obligations.42  Relegating human 
rights to the ILO meant that there is no effective enforcement 
mechanism for ILO standards.43  Although some lingering debate 
over linking human rights to WTO law continues, 44  developing 
countries appear to have won their battle to keep human rights 
outside of the WTO. 
The most important consequence of excluding human rights 
from the WTO is that human rights cannot be used as a justification 
for a trade restriction consistent with the WTO.45   However, the 
WTO does recognize certain exceptions based on non-trade 
concerns, such as health and safety standards related to imported 
goods, which can be used to limit trade.46  The effect of the 1996 
                                                 
42  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 
3, at 63.  The WTO dispute settlement system contains a tribunal of first 
instance, the WTO Panel, and an Appellate Body, which functions as a busy 
appellate court of international trade.  The opinions of the Panel and 
Appellate Body are then adopted by the entire WTO membership sitting as 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).  See id. at 64.  Once the opinions are 
adopted there is political and peer pressure on the offending WTO member 
nation to comply with the recommendations of the opinion.  Failure by the 
offending nation to comply could result in the authorization by the WTO of 
trade sanctions against the offending member.  See id. at 66.  In most cases, 
members will comply with the recommendations or reach a mutually 
satisfactory solution with the complaining member.  For a general overview 
of the WTO dispute settlement system, see generally CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at ch. 2. 
43  See Phillip R. Seckman, Invigorating Enforcement Mechanisms of 
the International Labor Organization in Pursuit of U.S. Labor Objectives, 32 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 675, 684 (2003).  Unlike the WTO, the ILO has 
no dispute settlement system.  See supra note 42.  This means that although 
the ILO promulgates standards, there is no recourse and no consequences if a 
nation refuses to abide by the ILO’s standards. 
44  Some influential voices have called for the WTO to adopt an explicit 
Declaration on Human Rights and International Trade, but the vast majority 
of WTO members oppose any linkage between WTO law and human rights.  
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 
371–72.  
45  CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, 
at 370. 
46   These exceptions are contained in GATT Article XX, creating 
general exceptions to trade: 
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Article XX General Exceptions 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plan life 
or health; 
(c) relating to the importations or exportations of 
gold or silver; 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to 
customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies 
operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article 
XVII, the protection of patents, trademarks and 
copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; 
(e) relating to the products of prison labour; 
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures 
of artistic, historic or archaeological value; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
 conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption;… 
 
GATT, supra note 19, at art. XX.  These general exceptions can be 
used to impose a justified trade restriction.  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 305.  For example, Article 
XX(b) allows a trade restriction when necessary “to protect human . . . life or 
health.”  GATT, supra note 19, at art. XX. This provision has been 
interpreted to allow trade restrictions of imported goods that might be 
dangerous to human safety, such as products containing asbestos, or food 
products that are unsafe for human consumption.  See, e.g., CHOW & 
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 319–40 
(discussing problems dealing with food safety and asbestos).  A number of 
other exceptions relating to issues such as environmental protection are also 
recognized by Article XX.  See id. at 301–18 (discussing environmental 
protection implications).  Under current WTO jurisprudence, however, none 
of these exceptions apply to human rights.  See id. at 371–72.  For an 
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Ministerial Declaration is to remove human rights from the list of 
these exceptions. 47   The following examples examine the 
ramifications of this effect: 
Example 1:  Suppose that prior to 2001, when 
China joined the WTO, the United States passes a 
law that imposes trade restrictions on imports from 
China in the form of higher tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions (quotas) for human rights violations in 
China.  Nothing in the WTO provisions prevent the 
United States from using human rights as a 
justification for trade sanctions against a non-WTO 
country.  This is an internal political issue in the 
United States and a foreign trade or economic 
relations matter between the United States and 
China.  
Example 2:  Once China acceded to the WTO in 
2001, however, the United States became bound to 
extend MFN treatment to all trade transactions with 
China.  To illustrate this point, let us further 
suppose that in 2012, the United States imposes 
restrictions, e.g., tariffs and quotas, on imports 
from China, a WTO member, on the grounds that 
China tolerates or engages in many human rights 
violations in its territory.  These trade restrictions 
deny China MFN treatment because they impose 
higher rates than the United States’ GATT bound 
rates.  In 2012, these trade restrictions are not 
lawful under the WTO.  China can bring a 
challenge to these trade restrictions in the WTO 
dispute settlement system and will win.48 
                                                                                              
overview of GATT Article XX, see generally CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 300–72. 
47  It would have been possible to include human rights as an exception 
by issuing a formal WTO declaration or by interpreting the provisions of 
GATT Article XX, the general exceptions provision, to include human rights 
as a ground for imposing a trade restriction.  
48  Winning the dispute means that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) will “recommend” that the United States withdraw the trade 
restriction.  Most WTO members will follow the recommendations of the 
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Hence, the exclusion of human rights from the WTO means that 
even when there is a direct economic connection between trade and 
human rights, such as labor conditions, these rights still cannot be 
used to justify a trade restriction, such as in the following example: 
Example 3:  Suppose that due to poor working 
conditions, e.g., lack of sanitation, long working 
hours, low wages, and unsafe conditions at work, 
China is able to manufacture tablet computers at a 
very low cost.  These conditions would violate U.S. 
labor laws as well as the standards set by the 
International Labor Organization.  The United 
States seeks to impose extra tariffs on Chinese 
imports in addition to the normal GATT tariffs on 
the grounds that the poor labor conditions create a 
cost advantage to China, i.e., a subsidy that should 
be offset by a higher tariff, i.e., a countervailing 
duty.49  The imposition of a higher tariff to offset 
                                                                                              
DSB because all WTO members have a stake in the effective functioning of 
the WTO system.  WTO members who do not follow the recommendations 
of the DSB on a timely basis are subject to a variety of additional actions by 
the DSB, which can include authorizing the aggrieved state (the winning 
state in the dispute) to impose retaliatory trade sanctions on imports from the 
offending state (the losing state in the dispute).  The WTO authorizes these 
retaliatory measures in addition to compliances with the recommendations of 
the DSB.  CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 
3, at 67–68. 
49  The WTO allows an importing country to impose a countervailing 
duty, i.e., an additional tariff on top of the normal GATT rate, to offset the 
effect of a subsidy, i.e., a financial contribution by a foreign government to a 
manufacturer to assist in exports.  The subsidy reduces the cost to the 
manufacturer, which can now charge a lower price for the export, creating a 
competitive advantage in the target import market.  Article VI of the GATT 
allows the importing country to impose a countervailing duty equal to the 
amount of the subsidy to offset, or neutralize, the benefit of the subsidy.  The 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement) amplifies Article XVI of the GATT.  See GATT, supra note 19, 
at art. VI.  The purpose of the SCM Agreement is to discipline the use of 
subsidies.  In other words, while countervailing duties are permitted to offset 
subsidies, the WTO does not want member states to abuse the use of 
subsidies to erect protectionist trade barriers.  As a result, the SCM 
Agreements set forth strict standards that each WTO member must follow in 
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the lower costs due to poor working conditions is 
not justified under the WTO.  China can challenge 
the trade restriction in the WTO dispute settlement 
body and will win.  Labor rights are not within the 
purview of the WTO, but under the WTO 
Ministerial Declaration of 1996, labor rights are 
within the jurisdiction of the ILO.  Therefore, the 
United States can challenge China’s working 
conditions in the ILO, but the resulting decision 
has no enforcement power.  
From these examples, the conclusion that may be drawn is that, 
at least as of 2012, the United States cannot use human rights to 
justify trade restrictions against China (or any other WTO member) 
consistent with the WTO.50  While future attempts might revive the 
debate over whether there is a link between human rights and WTO 
law, China and other developing countries are likely to strongly 
oppose any efforts to introduce human rights as a trade criterion into 
the WTO because of the competitive advantage they maintain by not 
being subjected to western human rights standards.  At least for the 
foreseeable future, WTO members will not be able to impose trade 
restrictions based on human rights. 
 
II.   NATIONAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL  
BUSINESS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE APPROACHES BY 
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
Below the multilateral level, nations are free to impose 
conditions that relate to human rights in international business on 
their own business entities and persons so long as the conditions do 
not violate any WTO obligations.  This is because the WTO is 
concerned with trade between states, not with domestic regulation of 
corporations and private actors if the regulation does not infringe 
upon WTO obligations.  These are matters reserved within the 
                                                                                              
imposing subsidies so that they are justified and do not, for example, impose 
a countervailing duty that is greater than the amount of the subsidy, which 
would result in a protectionist trade barrier. 
50  To the author’s knowledge, the United States has yet to use human 
rights to justify a trade restriction in the WTO. 
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national sovereignty of each state.  The United States and China have 
contrasting approaches to the use of human rights to discipline its 
own domestic corporations and private actors in the conduct of 
international business.  The next sections set forth these two 
contrasting approaches.   
 
A.   THE U.S. HANDS ON APPROACH 
As further set forth below, the United States views human rights 
as an important restraint on the conduct of international business by 
U.S. corporations and U.S. nationals.  For countries the United States 
considers friendly, it uses a hands on approach that uses trade to 
benefit these countries and to punish countries that have authoritarian 
governments with poor records on human rights.51  The apparent 
long-term goal of the United States is to influence countries with a 
poor record on human rights to change their authoritarian form of 
government to a democracy. 52   The United States has extensive 
national legislation that applies to both corporate and private 
domestic actors doing business abroad that have direct implications 
on doing business in countries with poor human rights records.  The 
most important of these legal regimes are set forth below. 
 
1.   TRADE EMBARGOES 
The United States has trade or investment embargoes with Cuba, 
Iran, Libya, Sudan, North Korea, and Burma implemented by the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control under the Trading with the Enemy 
Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.53  These 
                                                 
51  See Andrew B. Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: 
U.S. Progressivism and China’s New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 356, 
380–83 (2011). 
52  See DEBRA LIANG-FENTON, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS 
POL’Y: A 20-YEAR ASSESSMENT (1999), available at http://www.usip 
.org/files/resources/sr990616.pdf (analyzing U.S. policy from the Carter 
administration through the Clinton administration, during which time the 
U.S. often viewed pushing countries towards electoral democracy as a means 
of protecting human rights). 
53  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 
supra note 13, at 135. 
28 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF   [Vol. 9.1 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 
 
embargoes effectively preclude any trade in goods with these 
countries,54 with the exception of a small category of products used 
for humanitarian purposes, such as medicines. 55   In addition, the 
United States has many laws that limit trade with certain countries or 
persons.56  The United States justifies these embargoes under GATT 
Article XXI, which provides an exception for national security.57 
 
2.   U.S. LEGISLATION 
The United States enforces the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA), which prohibits the giving of bribes to foreign officials for 
the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. 58   The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) has recently begun to enforce the FCPA 
aggressively59 by punishing anti-bribery violations through civil and 
criminal penalties.60  The FCPA prohibits the giving of “anything of 
value” to foreign officials.  This term includes not only the payment 
of cash but many other types of transactions.  Recently, the DOJ has 
interpreted anything of value to include: 
. . . paying for executive training programs at U.S. 
universities for Chinese foreign officials . . . when 
the programs did not specifically relate to the 
company’s products or business . . . payment of 
tuition for educational opportunities for Chinese 
officials . . . providing a paid internship for the 
                                                 
54  See id. 
55   For example, the United States permits informational materials, 
donated food, medicine and medical devices, agricultural commodities and 
gift parcels to be exported to Cuba.  See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS 
CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY CUBA: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 
ABOUT U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA 16 (2012), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ 
cuba.pdf. 
56  See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 
supra note 13, at 135–36. 
57  GATT art. XXI, supra note 19. 
58  See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(b), (dd)(1)–
(3) (2006).  See also Spalding, supra note 51, at 372. 
59  Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 573, 574 (2012) [hereinafter Chow, FCPA]. 
60  See id. at 576. 
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daughter of a Chinese official, and payment for 
sightseeing trips for Chinese officials to such 
places as Disneyworld, the Grand Canyon, and Las 
Vegas.61   
Many U.S. corporations now consider the FCPA to be a major 
business issue (a so-called “bet the company” issue) and are actively 
creating compliance programs for their overseas operations.62  Due to 
China’s political system with many state-owned or -controlled 
enterprises, many persons will qualify as foreign officials63 under the 
DOJ’s aggressive interpretations;64 as a result, China poses higher 
risks under the FCPA than many other countries,65 but the FCPA 
operates as a general constraint on all U.S. companies in doing 
business abroad. 
Recent litigation has revived the Alien Tort Statute, dormant for 
nearly 200 years, which allows a foreign national to sue in a federal 
district court for a tort committed in violation of the “law of 
nations.”66  The ATS has been used by foreign nationals to sue U.S. 
companies that act in concert with authoritarian governments in 
various foreign investment projects.  For example, if a U.S. company 
works in partnership with a foreign government and government 
                                                 
61  Id. at 589–90. 
62  In 2012, a Morgan Stanley employee in Singapore was convicted of 
violating the FCPA.  The U.S. Department of Justice declined to file charges 
against the company because of the internal controls it has in place to 
prevent FCPA violations.  See e.g. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former 
Morgan Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading 
Internal Controls Required by FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-534.html. 
63   Only payments to “foreign officials” are covered by the FCPA.  
Payments to private individuals (i.e. commercial bribery) are not illegal 
under the FCPA, which is concerned only with government corruption.  The 
DOJ interprets “foreign officials” so broadly that some U.S. companies take 
the position that anyone in China who works for a state-owned company is a 
foreign official.  See Chow, FCPA, supra note 59, at 580. 
64  Id. at 578–89. 
65  Id. at 607. 
66  The Alien Tort Statute reads in its entirety: “[t]he district Courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
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soldiers conscript and abuse workers, the foreign workers (with the 
help of a nongovernmental organization involved human rights) can 
bring a lawsuit against the U.S. company in federal district court in 
the United States for the abuse of human rights under the law of 
nations.67  In another recent case, the Second Circuit refused to grant 
a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging human rights abuses by a 
U.S. pharmaceutical company that conducted dangerous drug trials 
on human subjects in a developing country.68 
 
3.   FOREIGN AID 
When the United States gives foreign aid in the form of grants or 
loans, either directly or through the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund, two sister institutions of the WTO,69 the aid comes 
                                                 
67  These facts are based on Doe v. Unocal, a decision later vacated by 
an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Doe v. Unocal 
Corp., 110 F.Supp.2d 1294 (C.D.Cal. 2000), rev’d en banc, Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).  The crucial issue of whether the ATS 
applies to U.S. corporations is now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., which is expected to be decided in 
2012.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 472.  
68   Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 172–83 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(discussing why claims under ATS survive motion to discuss).  For a 
discussion of recent cases and the current issues in ATS litigation, see Joseph 
G. Finnerty III et al., Circuit Split Widens: Corporate Liability under the 
Alien Tort Statute, FOR THE DEF., Nov. 2011, at 78. 
69  The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assist 
the WTO in promoting free trade.  The World Bank’s primary goal is to 
alleviate world poverty while the role of the IMF is to encourage 
predictability and stability in the flow of currency (money) across borders 
used for the payment of goods or to satisfy other financial obligations.  The 
IMF encourages the free convertibility of currencies and discourages 
currency devaluation.  For example, if Country A buys goods from Country 
B, Country B may insist that Country A pay for the goods in Country B’s 
currency.  If Country A lacks foreign currency reserves, Country A may be 
forced to pay Country B in Country A’s own currency.  The IMF will 
encourage Country B to exchange Country A’s currency for its own.  For a 
further discussion of the role of the World Bank and the IMF in assisting 
international trade, see CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 
supra note 3, at 19–23. 
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along with a package of required reforms that the beneficiary must 
accept.  These reforms, called the Washington Consensus,70 relate to 
fiscal discipline, trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization of 
state enterprises, and control of government corruption.71 
 
B.   CHINA’S HANDS OFF APPROACH 
By contrast to the United States, China has a hands off approach 
to human rights.  China views each country’s form of government, its 
political system, and its track record on human rights as applied to its 
own citizens as an issue of national sovereignty that is its own 
concern and of no concern to anybody else in business, trade, or 
politics. 72   The overview of China’s laws and policies below 
demonstrate how China implements this approach. 
 
1.   CHINA’S LAWS 
As a result of its hands off approach, China has no official trade 
embargoes with any country due to reasons of the human rights 
record of the trading partner.73  In fact, China trades with regimes, 
                                                 
70  Both the World Bank and the IMF are located in Washington, D.C., 
on the opposite sides of the same street.  At one time, both institutions were 
in the same building.  By tradition, the President of the World Bank is an 
American while the Chief of the IMF is a European.  These traditions 
continue to this very day.  Both the World Bank and the IMF also work 
closely with the U.S. Treasury Secretary.  The term “Washington 
Consensus” was coined to describe this “clubby” power arrangement, with 
its locus in Washington, D.C.  Id. at 19–21. 
71  Id. at 21–22. 
72  See Spalding, supra note 51, at 388–97. 
73  To the author’s knowledge, China has no official trade embargoes 
with any country; unlike the United States, which has many private trading 
companies that act autonomously, all trading companies in China are subject 
to the control of the state, so China does not need an official embargo to 
control trade, but it can regulate trade effectively through internal controls.  
32 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF   [Vol. 9.1 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 
 
such as Sudan,74 that are considered by international organizations to 
have a poor human rights record.75 
China recently amended its criminal law, effective May 2011, to 
implement its own version of an FCPA.76  China did so to fulfill its 
obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
to which it is a signatory.77  However, as of this writing, China has 
not enforced this law, and it is unclear whether China passed the law 
due to genuine concern about government corruption in foreign 
countries or in an attempt to satisfy a formal treaty obligation.  China 
(or any other country) has no legislation that compares to the U.S. 
Alien Tort Statute, which is unique to the United States.  
When China gives aid in the form of a grant or loan, it comes 
with “no strings attached” for the recipient country.78  China uses this 
                                                 
74   See THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40940 CHINA’S 
ASSISTANCE AND GOV’T SPONSORED INV. ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA, LATIN 
AMERICA, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 9 (Nov. 25, 2009). 
75  See e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR IN THE SHADOWS: THE 
SUDANESE GOV’T ONGOING ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(June 2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
sudan0611ForWebUpload.pdf. 
76  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) enacted an amendment in 
2011 to Article 164 of its Criminal Law, which now provides for the “Crime 
of Offering Bribes to Officials of Foreign Countries and International Public 
Organizations.”  Article 164 states: “Whoever, for the purpose of seeking 
unjustified business interests, gives money or property to any foreign party 
performing official duties or officials of international public organizations 
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the preceding 
Paragraph.”  Article 163, the preceding paragraph, provides for criminal 
penalties.  See John M. Hynes, China Beefs up its Anti-Bribery Law with its 
Very Own Version of the FCPA, GOV’T CONT., INVESTIGATIONS, & INT’L 
TRADE BLOG (last updated Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.government 
contractslawblog.com/2011/03/articles/fcpa/china-beefs-up-its-antibribery-
law-with-its-very-own-version-of-the-fcpa/.  
77  United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. 
Doc A/RES/58/4, art.16 (Oct. 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/
08-50026_E.pdf.   
78   See, e.g., Patrick Barta, Cambodia Says No Strings Attached in 
Recent Chinese Aid, SE. ASIA REAL TIME BLOG (Sept. 6, 2012, 7:16 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2012/09/06/cambodia-says-no-strings-
attached-in-recent-chinese-aid. 
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approach to foreign aid to build relationships with countries in 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. 79   Some of these 
countries—particularly those in Africa—do not receive aid from the 
United States or significant investments from U.S. corporations.  The 
U.S. government avoids these countries for political reasons due to 
the authoritarian and corrupt nature of their regimes. 80   U.S. 
corporations find that the risks of doing business in these countries 
and transactions costs are high due to the need to comply with U.S. 
laws regulating international business, such as the FCPA.81 
The U.S. approach creates risks and high transactions costs that 
deter U.S. companies from doing business with certain countries, 
which creates opportunities for China to step into the void and be a 
“Black Knight.”82  In recent years, China has begun to actively seize 
these opportunities to invest in countries that the United States 
avoids, particularly in Africa, and to create strong relationships with 
these countries.83  
 
2.   CHINA’S LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES 
China’s hands off policy on human rights in its international 
trade and business serves both economic and political purposes.  
These purposes involve core sovereignty issues for China. 
                                                 
79  See LUM, supra note 74, at 1. 
80   For example, the Office of Foreign Assets Controls in the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury administers an almost complete trade embargo 
with Sudan due to human rights violations and national security concerns.  
See Sudan Sanctions, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Pages/sudan.asp
x (last updated Dec. 5, 2012).  Other African nations subject to trade 
sanctions include Somalia and Zimbabwe.  See Sanction Programs and 
Country Information, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.
aspx (last updated Dec. 19, 2012).  The sanctions regime of the Treasury 
Department is only one of several U.S. sanctions programs, so other 
sanctions may overlap and apply in addition to the Treasury restrictions.  See 
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra 
note 13, at 134-42. 
81  See Spalding, supra note 51, at 406. 
82  See id. at 407. 
83  See LUM, supra note 74, at 8–12. 
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With its growing economy, China’s long-term economic goal is 
to obtain natural resources, such as oil and minerals for its ongoing 
massive infrastructure projects, such as building roads and railroads 
to support its modernizing economy. 84   Many of the projects in 
Africa result in the shipment of oil and other natural resources to 
China as “payment” by the recipient country of foreign aid.85 
China also has a long-term political objective, which is to 
promote China’s own competing vision of international business 
around the world: a hands off approach that vindicates the sovereign 
right of each nation to conduct its own internal affairs, including on 
matters of human rights, without any interference from other 
countries.86  China does business with nations viewed as pariahs by 
the United States because China believes that how each nation deals 
with its own internal affairs is its own concern.87  This vision allows 
                                                 
84   See The New Colonialists, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/10853534 (describing issues created by 
China’s need to obtain large amounts of commodities); see also, Josephine 
Moulds, China Boosts Economy with £99bn Infrastructure Plan, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sep. 7, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/07/ 
china-boosts-economy-infrastructure-plan (describing a new infrastructure 
plan to build highways, waterways and urban rail).  
85  See LUM, supra note 74, at 9–10. 
86  This is the author’s own analysis of China’s long-term goals.  
87  See, e.g., XIANFA preamble (1982) (China) (“China adheres to an 
independent foreign policy as well as to the five principles of mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and 
culture exchanges with other countries.”); Tom Ginsburg, Eastphalia as the 
Perfection of Westphalia, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 39 (2010) 
(“China’s consistent position has been one of sovereignty, mutual 
noninterference, and refraining from criticizing other countries for their 
internal behavior.”).  China believes that a country’s policies towards the 
human rights of its own citizens are an internal affair of national sovereignty 
and not subject to interference.  In particular, China objects to the attempts 
by the United States to impose its own view of human rights on other 
countries.  See, e.g., Erin E. Douglas, The Struggle for Human Rights Versus 
Stability: The Chinese Communist Party and Western Values Clash, 29 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 151, 159 (2011) (“Values are, in [China’s] view, 
highly ethnocentric and alien to local cultures and thus have no relevance to 
the internal affairs in China.  Therefore, China argues those human rights 
conditions in democratic and communist nations will differ.  [China] 
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China’s leaders, the elite of the Communist Party, to assert complete 
freedom in dealing with their own internal political affairs, including 
the use of force, if necessary, to maintain the Party’s grip on power.88  
This vision also allows China to assert the right to use force against 
Taiwan, considered by China to be a renegade province, and, to a 
lesser extent, against Tibet. 89   In particular, Taiwan is a core 
sovereignty matter with which China has repeatedly warned the 
United States not to interfere. 90  The United States, however, has 
consistently and repeatedly ignored these warnings, and continues to 
supply advanced military weapons to Taiwan with the objective of 
allowing Taiwan to use them in defense against an attack by China.91  
                                                                                              
believes that [its] political system and economic policy do not lend 
themselves to a ‘Western’ definition.”).   
88   See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 120 (2d ed. 2009) (“[T]he CPC 
(Communist Party of China), once having overcome seemingly 
overwhelming odds and paid the costly price of obtaining, is not likely to 
relinquish it voluntarily.  In the more than 2000 years of Chinese history . . . , 
no ruling government of mainland China has ever voluntarily relinquished or 
transferred power to a succeeding government.  No succeeding government 
has ever assumed power without destroying the presiding government.”).  
When China’s Party leaders feel that their grip on power is challenged or in 
peril, they will not hesitate to use force against their own citizens.  On June 
4, 1989, the Communist Party ordered units of the People’s Liberation Army 
to violently suppress pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, 
resulting in many deaths of unarmed civilians.  In the following month, a 
massive nationwide manhunt for other “hidden enemies” ensued, resulting in 
many executions.  See id. at 20.    
89  Id. at 14. 
90  See id. 
91  The United States has sold advanced fighter jets to Taiwan over 
vehement objections by China.  See US Confirms $5bn Taiwan F-16 Fighter 
Jet Upgrade, BBC NEWS (Sep. 21, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-pacific-15009033.  At one time, the United States and Taiwan had a 
mutual defense treaty: each country would come to the defense of the other 
in case of a military attack.  Of course, the real purpose of this treaty was to 
send a message to China that the United States would come to Taiwan’s 
defense in case of an attack by China.  This treaty was abrogated after the 
United States established formal diplomatic relations with China.  See 
Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.-China, Dec. 2, 1954, 61 U.S.T. 433; see also 
Raoul Berger, President’s Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 
NW. U. L. REV. 577 (1980). 
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It is nearly impossible to underestimate the depth of China’s feeling 
over the core issue of Taiwan and its impact on much of China’s 
foreign policies, including foreign trade.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
On the multilateral level of the WTO, human rights are not a 
criterion of fair trade.  The most important consequence of this 
position is that human rights violations cannot be used as a 
justification for a trade restriction by the United States against China 
(or any other country) under the WTO.  At least for the foreseeable 
future, this position is not likely to change.  For years, China was 
subject to the United States’ annual review of its human rights record 
in order to receive normal trade relations.  The United States used 
this review as an occasion to criticize and pressure China on human 
rights.  By joining the WTO, China has now escaped this process, 
perceived by China as an annual bullying ritual inflicted by the 
United States.  China and other developed countries will likely 
strongly oppose any future attempts to include human rights within 
the WTO.  
Outside of the WTO, on a national level, there now appears to 
exist an increasing competition between two opposing visions of the 
role of human rights in international business for companies and 
persons.  This competition, although ostensibly about trade, 
implicates fundamental issues about national sovereignty and the 
power of states over their internal affairs.  On the one hand, the 
United States’ approach ties human rights to the conduct of 
international business by corporate and private actors.  At its most 
fundamental level, this position is based upon the view that human 
rights form the foundation for a democratic form of government, a 
form of government that the United States seeks to promote around 
the world.  This vision has been influential in international business 
in recent decades as the United States has used its economic power 
and political influence to promulgate this vision in the countries in 
which it does business around the world.  By contrast, China is 
promulgating its own opposing vision, which holds that human rights 
are not related to international business.  At its most fundamental 
level, China’s approach is asserting a vision of national sovereignty 
under which each nation has complete authority to deal with its own 
internal affairs without any outside interference.  This vision 
vindicates China’s right to control its own internal affairs, including 
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the core issue of whether the Communist Party can use force to 
maintain its power and the core issue of whether China can use force, 
if necessary, to repatriate Taiwan.  As China becomes more powerful 
and its influence spreads, 92  China’s approach may increasingly 
challenge the U.S. approach for supremacy around the world. 
 
  
                                                 
92  For a discussion of China’s rise as an economic power, see DANIEL 
C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA: PROBLEMS, CASES, 
AND MATERIALS 19–45 (2012). 
